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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE V. ROBINSON,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,

\
\

-vs.-

/

Case
No. 9377

CHESTER WHITELAW,
\
Defendant and Respondent.

})fs{& Jl/P~IV/
BRIEF OF i\PPELLJ\NTS ,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states generally that
the plaintiff and the defendant are neighbors in the area
of Beryl, Iron County, Utah; that each cleared his own
land sometime ago, and thereafter dust has on occasion
blown from the land of the defendant onto the land of
the plaintiff. There is no allegation of affirmative action
of the defendant in any manner creating this situation,
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and the only item complained of by the plaintiff performed by the defendant is the act of clearing land in approximately 1947. Now, fourteen years later he is complaining
because the defendant cleared land.
The defendant filed a motion for dismissal on the
ground that the amended complaint failed to state a
cause of action against the defendant for which the court
can give redress or take jurisdiction, and on the further
ground that this cause of action is barred by the following statutes, to-wit, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-12-25
and 78-12-26.
After the filing of this motion, same was duly called
for hearing on the 13th day of September, 1960, and
the court indicated that it was the court's intention to
dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, and to give
plaintiff's attorney an opportunity to amend same. Plaintiff's attorney stated that he desired not to amend same,
and thereupon the judgment of dismissal was duly entered.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I
The trial court did not err when it granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action against the defendant.
Point II
The trial court did not err when it granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause .of action
was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
2
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT
GRANTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE
GROUND THAT THE Al\1ENDED COMPLAINT FAILED
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
It is to be noted that unless the decision of the trial
court is upheld in this matter, any person who farms a
piece of ground and then for any reason satisfactory to
him, fails to continue farming same, may be subject to
an action of the type attempted to be initiated herein by
the plaintiff.

Although extensive research was done by the undersigned, the undersigned fails to find any case in which
the natural dust in itself has been held to be a nuisance.
Although the undersigned found many cases in which
items added to the dust had an influence thereon, in
cases where blasting and processing of soils were held to
be a nuisance, the undersigned failed to find any case
where natural dust without adulteration in any fashion
was held to be a nuisance. Apparently the plaintiff and
appellant has had the same experience. He has cited no
cases in which natural dust is held to be a nuisance.
The closest case found by the undersigned for dust
being held a nuisance without something being added to
it was the case of Mcintosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770,
230 Pac. 203. This is a situation whereby plaintiff alleged
maintenance in a chicken farm operation whereby the
chickens scratched the soil and dust blew onto the plaintiff's property arising from the scratching by the chickens. It was held that this was .a nuisance. This is a very
interesting case inasmuch as in the decision the holdings
showed, and the evidence held this finding:
3
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" :x, * * Dust blown from the defendant's chicken corrals into the plaintiff's grapes was not a pure soil,
but was impregnated with effuvia of the nature of
humous."
.

The implication from this case is that if it had been pure
soil there would have been no nuisance. Apparently, in
this California case, which is the strongest the undersigned has found, it took the addition of the effuvia from
the chickens to make a nuisance. In the case of Mcintosh
v. Brimmer there is a reference to the ruling of the Chancelor in the case of St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping
(11 H.L. Cas 642). in the Mcintosh Case, the California
court recognizes the Chancellor's ruling in the St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping case as the outstanding authority in the matter of nuisance. The Mcintosh case, purporting to quote from the St. Helen's Smelting Co. case,
makes the following quotation:

" * * * It seems but reasonable and just that the
neighbor who has brought something on his own
property, which was not naturally there, harmless to
others so long as it is confined to his own property,
but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on
his neighbor's, should be obliged to make good the
damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property.
"We think this to be the law, whether the things so
brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches."
This ruling which the Mcintosh case has incorporated from the St. Helen's Smelting Co. case apparently
explains the reason why the undersigned and opposing
counsel have failed to find any direct ruling in connection with dust alone being blown from an individual's
property onto a neighbor's property. There is the implication in the Mcintosh case that dust alone is not a nuisance, and the reference of the Mcintosh case to the St.
4
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Helen's Smelting Co. case and the adoption therein of
the ruling propounded by the Chancellor in the St. Helen's Smelting Co. case, apparently limit nuisance to that
which is brought onto the property and not kept there.
There is no question that the cases are legion in which
under certain conditions beasts, water, and filth have
been brought onto property and then allowed to get onto
a neighbor's property, and have the·n been held to be
nuisances. Under some conditions, stenches have been
held to be nuisances when not confined to the place they
originated, and when they were caused by something
brought onto the property. The undersigned has failed
to find any sort of a case where a stench originating on
property from natural causes has been held to be a nuisance. The undersigned has been unable to find any case
where dust, except as created by some manufacturing
process or some commercial enterprise, has been held to
be a nuisance. It seems that with most nuisance cases
accepting the St. Helen's Smelting Co. case as the emine·nt authority for nuisance, these items originating on the
property from natural causes have been intentionally
omitted from the nuisance doctrine. They certainly do
not come under the rule laid down in the St. Helen's
Smelting Co. case whkh is based on something being
brought onto the property and then not confined there.
The plaintiff and appellant places great emphasis on
the Ute Stampede Case, 142 Pac. 2d 690 (Utah), (which
the undersigned found at Page 670) which certainly is
not in point. However, it is noted that in this Ute Stampede case, action was brought under Utah Code annotated, 1943, Title 104-56-1, and following. The undersigned
is of the opinion that the 1949 Legislature repealed this
particular group of statutes, and that same have not
been re-enacted.
The Dunsbach v. Hollister case, decided in 1888, reported in 30 N. E. 1152, and in 3 A.L.R. 318, mentioned
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by counsel on Page 9 of appellant's brief, generally sets
forth a fact situation in which other materials have been
brought onto the lot and then blown off. Certainly this
is not in point with the case at bar. The annotation on
this particular case in 3 A.L.R. beginning at Page 310
and running through Page 324 inclusive, which includes
the portion on Page 318 quoted by counsel, has a considerable annotation on dust as a nuisance. In this A.L.R.
annotation, it is based entirely upon industrial dust created by a business of some sort moved onto the property, such as a cotton gin, which was the primary case involved, a blacksmith shop, a carpet cleaning plant, a
coal or coke handling shop, electric light plant, a factory,
a flour mill, a lime kiln, a sand pile, stonework handling,
a threshing machine, a woodworking plant, a copper polishing plant, a saw mill, or a stonecutting plant. In all
instances in this annotation 3 A.L.R. which counsel depends upon, something in addition was moved onto the
property, not just natural dirt left there.
The item cited by counsel on Page 10 of plaintiff's
brief, as 11 A.L.R. 1402, goes into a situation whereby
the defendant was using his property on which to stack
other materials that blew onto a neighbor's property. It
is again noted that this comes from the decision of the
St. Helen's Smelting Co. case advanced in the California
courts in the case of Mcintosh v. Brimmer previously
cited, which is often called "The Chicken. Case." In the
item cited by counsel in plaintiff's brief, the sand was
hauled onto the property and allowed to blow off. Also,
this was in a very restricted, highly industrialized and
residential area, and was not in a farming area. If the
action at bar is allowed, one cannot help but wonder at
what point the next farmer downwind from plaintiff will
commence an action against the plaintiff on the same
theory as the action now before the court.
There are many cases that hold that even when
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items are brought unto the property they are nut nuisances. One of the strongest in this regard is the case
of Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe RR. v. Armstrong, which
was in the Supreme Court of Kansas on 6 May 1905, cited
as 80 Pac. 978, 71 Kansas 366. In this case there was a
situation whereby a railroad had bee·n going along a
right-of-way adjacent to the property of Mr. Armstrong.
They lowered the bed so that the top of the smoke stacks
was even with the ground, thereafter, the smoke from
the various smoke stacks passed into the home and premises of Armstrong, and he brought the action for damages and for abatement. The Kansas Supreme Court held
that an authorized business, properly conducted at an
authorized place is not a nuisance,

" * «, * for whatever is lawful cannot be wrongful,
and the owner of a railroad thus organized and operated does not level damages to any residences permeated by smoke, cinders and gas emitted from the
engines to such an extent as to be injurious to the
health and comfort of the inhabitants."
The Kansas Supreme Court held further that one whose
residence is rendered uncomfortable or unhealthy to the
occupants by smoke, cinders and gas emitted from the
locomotive engines of a railway company, cannot recover damages therefor, in the absence of any constitutional
or statutory authority, where it appears that such company has not abused or exceeded its authority in locating
or constructing the railroad track in the operation of
its engines.
In the matter of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Company,
Supreme Court of Utah, 20 June 1927, 262 Pac. 269, 71
Utah 1, the trial court filed a verdict of $500 for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding: "This is
held not to be an actionable· nuisance." The court held
that discomfort caused by impregnation of atmosphere
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

within a manufacturing community, by disagreeable
odors and impurities, without injury to life or health,
does not constitute a nuisance as a matter of law. It
holds further that the operation of a modern, well-equipped oil refinery in an industrial section of a city, according to approved methods, a distance of 1000 feet or more
from a dwelling house to which offensive and disagreeable fumes or odors, not injurious to life or health, and
not ~causing any great physical injury or property injury, are occasionally carried, is, as a matter of law, a
proper use of property.
Also, in McMullen v. Jennings, 41 Pac. 2d 753, 141
Kansas 420, decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas 9
March, 1935, concerning the dust from a grain elevator,
it was held that this grain elevator was not a nuisance.
In the case of Mcivor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 172 Pac.
2d 578, quoted on Page 11 of plaintiff's brief, the question
of whether or not a nuisance exists does not arise from
a question of dust, but arises from the question of excavation in which insufficient land was left to hold plai'ntiff's
land in position. There is a great difference between the
case whereby land is excavated and the neighbor's land
runs into the pit, and in a natural dust question when
and where the wind blows.
In the case of Kendall v. Seaman, 63 New York 68,
20 American Reports 567, the court held that where there
is a fact situation of a lawful use in a proper area, there
can be no redress for a claim of careless, extraordinary,
or unnecessary use of the property.
In the present case, the defendant has not used his
land in any fashion that created a nuisance. The only
thing that plaintiff did was farm his land 14 years ago,
a·nd let it lie idle since. Can we say that a man must farm
his land whether or not he feels like doing so, and regardless of his own personal conditions?
8
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Point II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT
GRANTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE
GROUND THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Title 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
that within four years an action must be brought for
reliefs not otherwise provided by law.
If counsel claims that this is a trespass upon real
property, then Title 78-12-26, (1) would apply. It is noted that in this statute, various subsections other than
(1) pertaining to a 3-year statute of limitations, in many
fields contain statements that the action will not run
until the act complained of has been discovered. This
certainly would not be the case in the matter at bar, inasmuch is there is no question that the act complained
of has been known for in excess of 14 years, and the wind
has blown in excess of 14 years, according to plaintiff's
amended complaint.

The cases are legion that hold that the statute of
limitations does run. It is noted with interest that counsel
cites the case of Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co.,
173 N.W. 805. Although this case is not in point with the
case at bar, it is a question of dust from a quarrying
op~ration,
and from blasting. There w'as an area
known as the Kletzen tract which had been worked for
the last two years and was much closer than the other
areas. The Minnesota court held that this was a nuisa·nce
and enjoined same, specifically holding that if the defendant were engaged in quarrying on the 40-acre tract only,
which does not include the Kletzen tract, and was the
original tract, and was not operating its dust mill on the
Kletzen tract, the situation would be materially different.
But the operations on the Kletzen tract and in the dust
mill were begun only two years prior to the commence9
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ment of this action:

" * * * Defendant is now blasting nearer to the plaintiff's premises than ever before, and is creating dust
of a new character and in increased quantities. The
period over which these conditions have extended
is comparatively short, and no claim of laches can
be made successfully."
In this Brede v. Minnesota case, the court indicates that
were it not for the new operation on the new piece of
ground within the last two years, this action would not
lie.
In the matter of Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Company, Supreme Court of Utah December 3, 1918, 53 Utah
10, 177 Pac. 418, an action was brought to enjoin the
manufacture of gas. It was shown that the plant was
erected in 1906 and doubled in 1910. The court held that
the plaintiff was guilty of laches and as such was not
entitled to an injunction.
In the ,case of Thomas v. \Voodman, 23, Kansas 217,
33 American Reports 156, the owner of land below a dam
in the river built this dam to divert the water into a creek
for milliing purposes. Thereafter, the plaintiff delayed for
two or three years after he discovered the water below
the dam adjacent to his residence became stagnant, before taking the necessary steps to establish the existence of an all.edged nuisance caused by such dam, during
which time the dam was twice washed out and rebuilt.
The trial court held that he was not entiled to equitable
relief, and the Supreme Court uphelp this decision.
In the matter of Gibbs v. Gardner, 80 Pac. 2d 371, 7
Montana 76, the defendant for a period in excess of twenty years removed water from a ditch by a specific type
of headgate with boards therein. Action was brought by
the plaintiff to stop him from removing water from the
ditch, claiming that the headgate and boards therein
10
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constituted a nuisance. The trial court held that although
it did not give the defendant a right to any water of the
plaintiff, the failure of the plaintiff to bring an action
and to abate this nuisance for such a period of time, was
such that this plaintiff had now lost his right to ask for
equitable relief, and therein makes the statement that
"One who slept on his rights will be denied equitable relief." The Supreme Court of MO'ntana upheld this, and
quotes the following cases in support of its position that
abatement will not stand under an unreasonable period
of time:. Thomas v. Woodman, 23 Kansas 217, 33 American Reports 156; Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 65 Atlantic 516; Washington Lodge v. Frelinghuysen, 138 Mich.
350, 101 N. W. 569, Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas
Light Co., 128 Missouri App. 96, 106 S. W. 594.
In the matter of McMorran v. Cleveland, Cliff's Iron
Co., 234 N.W. 163, 253 Mich. 65, there was a situation
where a dock on which coal was stored and used to refuel
the ships plying their trade on the Great Lakes was
sought to be enjoined from its operation. The Supreme
Court held that this matter was protected by laches.
In the matter of O'Hair v. California Prune & Apricot
Growers Association, 20 Pac. 2d 375, 130 Cal. P.L. 673, it
was held that where a defendant operated a fruit processing plant discharging waste water for 8 years into a sewer system which discharged into a slough flowing through
plaintiff's land, plaintiff's laches barred damage action.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's amended complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
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